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Facilitated Communication: A Scientific
Theory Or A Mode of Communication?
Should People With Autism Have A Voice
In Court?
Now the light of research has cast a new shadow on the autistic
child whose behavior has been illuminated with clinical facts
and scientific theories. With more light, the shadow shows
increasingly sharp boundaries that do not disappear at the first
cloud. Do what you will, you cannot realize half you conceive;
the vision flies. Go where you may, you cannot hope to find
the truth pictured in your mind. The changeless autistic child
is more apt to change than all the world around him. But we
see only what we look for, and we look for only what we
know.'
I. Introduction
In the late 1970s, facilitated communication, 2 also known as
augmentative communication, was introduced as a means of educating
people diagnosed with autism. Under this method of communication,
facilitators offer people with autism physical support while they type
words on a keyboard.' By using this technique, people with autism have
exhibited an ability to understand written and spoken language.4
Skeptics argue, however, that facilitated communications result from the
facilitators physically manipulating the persons' hands. 5 This disbelief
stems from the observation that people with autism have a qualitative
impairment in cognitive and language skills;' therefore, skeptics believe
they can not communicate meaningfully or type abstract thoughts.7
In 1992, facilitated communication impacted the legal field when
testimony received via this technique was offered as evidence in two New

1.
2.

I. NEWrON KUGELMASS, M.D., PH.D., Sc.D., THE AuriST CHILD 3 (1970).
Facilitated communication involves hand-over-handor hand-on-forearm support ofstudents

by a facilitator as they point to pictures, letters, or objects to augment communication. Douglas
Biklen et al., I AMN NOT A UTISTIVC ON THJE TYP (I'm not Autistic on the typewriter), 6
DiSABILiTY, HANDICAp AND Soc'y 161, 163 (1991).
3. See infra Part II.
4. Biklen, supra note 2, at 164.
5. See DSS ex rel. Jenny S. v. Mark & Laura S., 593 N.Y.S.2d 142 (N.Y. Faro. Ct. 1992).
6. See infra Part II. This author uses the word "observation" because this theory of cognitive
impairment is based on observational studies, not deductible proof.
7. Jenny S., 593 N.Y.S.2d at 142.
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York courts! Opponents contested the admission of the testimony by
arguing that the technique was scientific in nature and, therefore, subject
to the Frye test, which requires proof of the general acceptability of
scientific evidence before it can be used in court. The court accepted the
opponents' argument and held that the evidence was inadmissible until its
reliability and general acceptability could be proven as required by Frye.
As a result, the evidence was excluded without determining the truth of
the allegation.9 However, by the following year, another court treated
testimony received through facilitated communication differently.
In 1993, a New York Family Court found that facilitated
communication was not based on a scientific technique and that the Frye
test was inapplicable.1" The court held that testimony obtained through
facilitated communication is a simultaneous transmission of thoughts into
written form." Therefore, the court's analysis focused on whether the
witness was competent to testify and whether the facilitator was qualified
to administer the technique. 2 In order to alleviate concerns of potential
physical manipulation by the facilitators, the court suggested preventing
the facilitators from hearing the questions posed to the witness with
autism. Therefore, if the responses contextually coincide with the
questions, the court will know that the witness, not the facilitator, is
answering the questions."
This Comment argues that facilitated communication should be
considered a simultaneous transmission of thoughts into written form and
is not scientific evidence. Part II explains the syndrome labeled autism
and the development of facilitated communication. Part III outlines the
recent cases addressing the admissibility of testimony obtained by
facilitated communication. The development of the Frye test, the
relevancy test, and the test established by the Federal Rules of Evidence
are set forth in Part IV. Part V discusses the different types of evidence
labeled "hard" and "soft" scientific evidence. Part VI explains why the
Frye test, the relevancy test, and the test established by the Federal Rules
of Evidence should not be applied to facilitated communication. Finally,
Part VII argues that courts should consider the authenticity of individuals'
communications on a case-by-case basis.

8.
9.
JOURNAL,
10.
It.
12.
13.

See infra notes 44-55 and accompanying test.
Robyn Pforr, Autistic's machine-aided tale of abuse disallowed by judge, RECORDSept. 20 1992, at A7.
Jenny S., 593 N.Y.S.2d at 142.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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II. Background on Autism and Facilitated Communication
Historically, medical experts did not recognize autism as a separate
syndrome, 4 but classified it under the vague category of childhood
schizophrenia. 5 However, in 1943 Dr. Lee Kanner, a child psychiatrist
at the Johns Hopkins Medical School, recognized autism as a separate
syndrome.' 6 Kanner noticed that autism afflicted children between birth
and thirty months. 7 He noted several symptoms of autism, including
social and emotional impairments, typically with the individual's motor
actions not reflecting their mood, an inability to develop speech in order
to communicate, an inability to relate to people as whole human beings,
and an intellectual capacity below average."
Following Dr. Kanner's work, experts intensely studied autism in an
attempt to clarify its symptoms and discover its cause.' 9 Autism is
attributed to several causes, including genetic defects, 20 fetal exposure
to prenatal viruses,2' and nurturing deficiencies.22 None of these
theories, however, demonstrate a universal cause of autism.
While researchers have not pinpointed autism's cause, they have
interpreted its various symptoms by observing behaviors in controlled
settings. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
23
(DSM-III-R) lists the following symptoms for diagnosing autism:

14. Roberto F. Tuchman, M.D. et al., Autistic and Dysphasic Children : Clinical
Characteristics,88 PEDIATRICS 1211 (Dec. 1991). Autism is referred to as a syndrome because its
diagnosis relies on examining a person's behavior. Id. at 1211.
15. JEANNE SIMMONS ET AL., THE HIDDEN CHILD - THE LINWOOD METHOD FOR REACHING
THE AUTISTIC CHILD 3 (1985).
16. Id. at3.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See Tuchman, supra note 14, at 1211; MARY COLEMAN ET. AL., CLASSIc READINGS IN
AUTISM 383 (1985); Beverly Merz, Evidence of New Physical, Genetic, Links in Autism, 261(21)
MEDICAL NEWS & PERSPECTIVES 3067 (June 2, 1989); Harold J. Morowitz, Autism and Authority,
24(4) HOSPITAL PRACTICE 221 (Apr. 15, 1989); Isabelle Rapin, MD, Disordersof Higher Cerebral
Function in Preschool Children, 142 AM. J. OF THE DISEASES OF CHILDREN 1178 (Nov. 1988).
20. Merz, supra note 19, at 3067. Studies indicate that some males with autism have a
chromosome abnormality known as Fragile X syndrome. Id.
21. COLEMAN, supra note 19, at 383. Studies show that some children who develop autism
were exposed to viral diseases, including cogenital rubella, measles encephalitis, and cytomegalovirus
infection. Id.
22. Rapin, supra note 19, at 1179. Bruno Beltelheim, a famous child psychologist,'
hypothesized that autism was caused by children retreating into themselves after sensing that their
mothers wished they did not exist. 1d.
23. WILLIAMS REID, DSM-II1-R TRAINING GUIDE 43-44 (1989). In order to classify people
as having autism, they must exhibit at least eight of the sixteen symptoms, including two from group
A, one from group B, and one from group C. Id. at 43.

99

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

SPRING

1995

Group A. Reciprocal social interaction, marked lack of awareness of
the existence of feelings of others, no or abnormal seeking of comfort
at times of distress, no or impaired imitation behavior, no or abnormal
social policy, and gross impairment in ability to make peer
friendships;
Group B: no mode of communication, markedly abnormal non-verbal
communication, absence of imaginative activity, marked abnormalities
in speech production, marked abnormalities in form of content of
speech, and marked impairment in the ability to initiate or sustain a
conversation, despite adequate speech.
Group C: stereotyped body movements, persistent preoccupation with
parts of objects, marked distress over changes in trivial aspects of the
environment, unreasonable insistence to following routines in precise
detail, and markedly restricted
range of interests, with preoccupation
24
with a narrow interest.
These symptoms have limited value and have been criticized because the
findings are based on subjective observations of human behaviors.25
The use of facilitated communication has challenged the validity of
these symptoms. DSM-III-R's Group B symptoms indicate that
individuals with autism should have a cognitive deficiency and an
inability to qualitatively develop langauge. Through the use of facilitated
communication, medical experts are discovering that the inability to
communicate is attributable to an impairment of motor skills' which
prevents an individual with autism from intiating an action.26 Because
people with autism can communicate through facilitated communication,
experts believe27 that they have a deficit in expression, but not in
understanding.
Facilitated communication is an evolving process in which the ideal
28
goal is for the student to learn how to communicate independently.
Initially, the facilitator begins by assisting the student in isolating an
index finger in order to type on a computer or letter board. 29 Next the

24. Id. at 43-4.
25. Biklen, supra note 2, at 162; Rapin, supra note 19, at 1179. The symptoms continually
face criticism because they are based on subjective interpretations of observations. "There is no test,
including blood, cerebrospinal fluid, neuroimaging, and electro-physiologic investigations, to confirm
the clinician's diagnostic impression of autism. Because of this, there is considerable controversy
among professionals regarding criteria for calling someone autistic." Rapin, supranote 19, at 1179.
26.

Douglas Biklen, Communication Unbound: Autism and Praxis,60 HARV. ED. REV. 291,

303 (1990).
27.
28.
29.

Id.
Biklen, supra note 26, at 293.
Biklen, supra note 2, at 163.
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facilitator asks a student basic questions, such as his or her name. a°
While the student types, the facilitator holds on to the student's hand,
wrist or forearm, offers physical resistance in order to steady the student's
movements, 3 1 and gives verbal support.32 As the student becomes
more comfortable with this technique, the facilitator offers less physical
support, usually by gradually moving the supporting hand back to the
student's elbow or shoulder.33 Eventually, some people with autism can
communicate by typing independently or with only slight physical
pressure on the elbow or shoulder.34
During the 1970s, Rosemary Crossley of the St. Nicholas Institution
in Melbourne, Australia, began using facilitated communication to help
individuals with cerebral palsy.3 5
She realized that facilitated
communication might be helpful for people with autism, and in March of
1985, began using the technique with Jonothan, a seven-year-old child
with autism.36 Despite Jonothan's proclivity to fidget, scratch, and run
from people, Crossley focused his attention on a Canon
Communicator.37 Initially, Crossley supported Jonothan's wrist and
directed his fingers to letters on the keyboard to spell out a few words.38
Crossley then asked him to spell "Dad," which he did with no prompting
but with some wrist support. 39 During the session, Jonothan even
corrected Crossley's misspelling of his name, which she had originally

30. Id.
3 1. Id. The facilitator does not guide the student's finger to the selection but simply stabilizes
the student's movements so that he or she can hit an intended target. Experts believe that the
physical support helps the student compensate for physical difficulties, such as poor eye-hand
coordination, low or high muscle tone, and finger extension and isolation problems. Id. at 163, 165.
32. Id. The verbal support includes speaking to the student in the same tone as one would to
a non-disabled student, explaining that the physical support has been effective in assisting other
students, and reminding the student to focus on the keyboard or other target. Id. at 163-164.
33. Id.
34. Biklen, supra note 2, at 163.
35. Biklen, supra note 26, at 293. Although Rosemary Crossley is credited with developing
faciliated communication, a woman from Skokie, Illinois is believed to be the first to use this
technique. Technique Began in Skokie, CHICAGO SUN-TIMEs, June 14, 1993, at 5. On December
17, 1960, Rosalind Oppenheim discovered that Ethan, her seven year old son with autism, could
write his own name when she placed her hand over his. Id. Dr. Bernard Rimland confirmed the
validity of this technique when Ethan successfully completed algebra problems, and Rosalind did not
know algebra. Id.
36. Biklen, supra note 26, at 294.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. Prompting occurs when a facilitator initiates the motion toward the keys. In the
beginning, this technique is helpful in introducing the child to the keyboard; however, people with
autism are encouraged to direct their own hands to the keyboard in order to achieve greater
independence. Id.
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spelled "Jonathan. No
Over time, Jonothan learned to communicate more
complex sentences and abstract thoughts." Jonothan now communicates
with several facilitators and types independently or with a hand on his
shoulder.4 2 Jonothan, however, was never able to communicate with his
mother during her lifetime. Jonothan's situation is not unusual as other
children have been unable to communicate with certain people.
Upon seeing facilitated communication demonstrated in Australia,
Dr. Douglas Biklen, head of Syracuse University's Facilitated
Communication Institute, introduced it throughout the United States in
1989." 3 Schools and other educational facilities now use facilitated
communication as a tool for teaching and understanding students with
autism. Through facilitated communication, these individuals finally have
a mode of communication to express their feelings and thoughts to other
people. Despite the apparent effectiveness of facilitated communication,
skeptics argue that the subject is not actually communicating, but being
physically manipulated by the facilitator. Facilitated communication fell
under judicial scrutiny when allegations of sexual abuse were received via
this technique.4 4

III. Common Law View of Facilitated Communication
In 1992, two New York courts faced the issue of whether to admit
evidence obtained using facilitated communication. 5 DSS ex rel. Jenny
S. v. Mark & Laura S.4 6 was the first case to address this issue. Using
facilitated communication, Jenny, a sixteen-year-old non-verbal child with
autism, alleged out of court that she was sexually abused by her father.4 7
Subsequently, in In re MZ.48 a ten year old, partially verbal child with
Down's syndrome, used facilitated communication in a fact finding

40. Id.
41. Biklen, supra note 26, at 292, 294-95.
42. Id. at 295.
43. Id. at 291. While visiting Rosemary Crossley at the Dignity through Education and
Language Communication Center (DEAL), Dr. Biklen witnessed several students using the technique.
Id.
44. DSS ex rel. Jenny S.v. Mark & Laura S., 593 N.Y.S.2d 142, 148 (N.Y. Fam. Ct 1992).
In re M.Z., 590 N.Y.S.2d 390 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1992).
45. Jenny S., 593 N.Y.S.2d at 142; MZ, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 390.
46. 593 N.Y.S.2d 142 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1992). Since 1990, fourteen cases of abuse and neglect
have been reported based, wholly or in part, on evidence received via facilitated communication. Pat
Burson, FacilitatedCommunication, Is It Harmful Manipulation? Pandora's Box: The technique that
aims to unlock the silent world of the verbally impaired has led to troubling court cases, ATLANTA
J. AND CONST., Oct. 20, 1993, at Al.
47. Jenny S., 593 N.Y.S.2d at 143.
48. 590 N.Y.S.2d 390 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1992).
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proceeding.49 Both courts determined that the testimony was not
admissible in court because facilitated communication did not satisfy the
requirements of admissibility under the Frye test." In applying the Frye
test, the courts examined whether facilitated communication produced
reliable results and was generally accepted in the scientific community.5 '
The courts determined that the relevant scientific community included
physicians, psychologists, psychiatrists, educators, neurologists, and
speech and language pathologists.5 2 After hearing opinions from several
individuals in these fields, the courts concluded that the reliability of
facilitated communication had not yet been proven despite reports of its
qualitative reliability.53 Consequently, the courts held that evidence

49. Id. at 390-91. Although the witness in this case has Down's syndrome, not autism, the
accuracy of the communication is a common concern. This Comment focuses on the syndrome of
autism; however, the arguments are equally applicable to any person with an impairment who seeks
to testify using facilitated communication. Id.
50. Jenny S., 593 N.Y.S.2d at 152; MZ., 590 N.Y.S.2d at 399.
51. Jenny S., 593 N.Y.S.2d at 148; MZ, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 391.
52. Jenny S., 593 N.Y.S.2d at 148; MZ., 590 N.Y.S.2d at 392.
53. Jenny S., 593 N.Y.S.2d at 144-45; MZ, 590 N.Y.S. 2d at 396-97. In March of 1989,
Australia's Intellectual Disability Review Panel published a report proving the validity of facilitated
communication. The Panel studied six people with autism. INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY REVIEW
PANEL, INVESTIGATIoN INTO THE RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY oF THE ASSISTED COMMUNICATION

1 (Mar. 1989). In order to ensure accurate results, the panel conducted the study in a
place familiar to the student, used facilitators who had worked with the students in the past, and
altered the questions to fit each student's capability. In order to reduce anxiety, the Panel had a
minimal number of observers and technical apparatus. The Panel conducted two types of studies.
In the first study, the students were asked four sets of ten questions. In Condition A, the
students and facilitators facilitated freely in a typical communication setting. In Condition B, the
students heard the same questions while, in Condition C, they heard different questions. In Condition
D, the students heard a question while the facilitators heard music. Throughout the study, the Panel
slowed the process down or took breaks if the students showed signs of fatigue. The Panel also
allowed verbal prompting, a customary procedure to help a person focus on the activity.
The second study consisted of a "message passing exercise." The students were brought to
different settings, such as a coffee shop, and were given gifts, such as clothing. After returning from
the activity, they were asked to tell the facilitator about their experiences or gifts.
The Panel concluded that the validity of the communications was demonstrated by four of the
six students who participated in the two studies. The Panel indicated that some manipulation took
place when the facilitator knew the question; however, this concern was eliminated when the
facilitator could not hear the question. The Panel noted that, although the other two students'
communications were not validated, this finding did not mean that they were unable to communicate.
Dr. Biklen indicates that one of these two children can now type independently, therefore validating
TECHNIQUE

his own communications. Douglas Biklen, Autism orthodoxy versus free speech: A reply to
Cummins and Prior, 62 HARV. ED. REV. 242 (1992).

In the message passing exercise, all three students successfully communicated their
experiences and gifts; however, they had difficulty in precisely labeling some of the items. One child
first typed that he had been given a "scarf," then "sox," until finally typing the correct answer, a "tshirt." INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY REVIEW PANEL, supra, at 37. When asked the color of the shirt,
he incorrectly typed "Blue," but hesitated after typing the "L." He finally typed the correct color,
"Black."
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obtained by facilitated communication must satisfy the requirements of
the Frye test before it can be admitted in court.
In 1993, a Massachusetts judge followed the reasoning of the New
York courts and granted a defendant's motion in limine to prohibit the
use of evidence obtained through facilitated communication. 4 The
judge stated, "I heard no evidence that it has been generally accepted by
the community of scientists involved with verbal communication and I
heard what I consider to be very credible and reliable evidence that it has
not."55 This type of analysis, equating facilitated communication with
scientific evidence, shifted when another New York court viewed
faciliated communication as a special mode of communication, more akin
to sign language.
In March of 1993, the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
held that the Frye test did not apply to facilitated communication. 6 In
In Re Luz p., 57 an eleven-year-old, nonverbal, mentally retarded child
with autism, alleged through facilitated communication that her parents
were sexually abusing her.5 The court found expert scientific testimony
unnecessary to admit the child's testimony, therefore, the Frye test did
not apply. 9

Currently, quantitative studies have not validated many communications. While applying these
tests, the operators have been mindful of the potential manipulation by the facilitator; therefore, as
a control, many of the experiments either give the facilitator and student different questions or
prevent the facilitator from knowing what questions the student asked. Gina Green, Controlled
Evaluations of FacilitatedCommunication, 7 AUTISM RESEARCH REv. 2 (1993). In Autism Research
Review, the results of twenty-one tests were published. Id. Of the individuals tested (103 out of 187
were people with autism) only three out of 187 students exhibited an ability to communicate in these
controlled conditions. While these tests seem to discredit the success of facilitated communication,
several criticisms can be offered to this validation procedure. See infra, Part VI, Subsection C.
54. Evidence; "FacilitatedCommunication"-Autistic Child, MASs. LAW. WKLY., May 10,
1993, at 18.
55. Id.
56. In re Luz P., 595 N.Y.S.2d 541, 542 (N.Y. App. Div.2d 1993). In People v. Webb, 597
N.Y.S.2d 565 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1993), a St. Lawrence County Court also permitted achild victim, who
had d'ifficulty in performing motor acts of speech, to testify by use of facilitated communication in
a fact finding proceeding. Id. at 567. The child received physical support under his wrist while he
typed. Id. For trial, however, the court will have a hearing in limine to determine whether facilitated
communication is scientific. Id. at 569.
In State v. Warden, No. 92-CRI 198 (1993), a Kansas court allowed a twelve-year old victim
of sexual abuse to testify by use of facilitated communication. During a preliminary hearing on the
admissibility of facilitated communication, the judge held that the Frye test did not apply. Id. The
defendant was found guilty of Indecent Liberties with a Child and sentenced to 3-10 years in prison.
Id.
57. Luz P., 595 N.Y.S.2d at 541.
58. Id. at 542. Her teachers indicated that, while using facilitated communication, she
demonstrated an ability to read and spell in both English and Spanish. Id.
59. Id. at 545.

FACILITATED COMMUNICATION

The court held that testimony obtained through facilitated
communication is actually a witness' thoughts transmitted into typed
words, and therefore, more akin to sign language.6 Further, the court
found that no expert witnesses, opinions, or scientific theories were
necessary in order to introduce the in-court statement, therefore, the Frye
test was inapplicable. The court found that the ability to communicate
should be determined on a case-by-case basis.6" "The capacity of a
witness to observe, remember and communicate goes to the question of
the competency of that witness." 2 Therefore, if the technique is
challenged, the court should examine whether the witness understands the
nature of the oath and can accurately recall the events at issue.63
The Luz P. court also addressed the issue of possible physical
manipulation of the witness' hand by the facilitator. The court found that
the issue of a facilitator's manipulation of the evidence should go to that
individual's qualifications.' Thus, if a party raises this issue of possible
facilitator manipulation, the court should determine whether the facilitator
This determination requires a
can reliably apply the technique.6"
A pragmatic approach
pragmatic approach, not expert testimony."
makes the most sense because the Frye test produces the unnecessarily
harsh result of denying a class of individuals the right to testify in court
and incorrectly transforms facilitated communication into scientific
evidence.
IV. The Development of Admissibility Rules for Scientific Evidence
In 1923 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia established the Frye test in order to determine the admissibility
of expert testimony. In United States v. Frye,67 James Alphonzo Frye
stood trial for murder.6" His lawyers offered as evidence an expert
witness' opinion derived from a deception test. 69 The expert witness

60. Id. at 546.
61. Luz P., 595 N.Y.S.2d at 545.
62. Id. at 543.
63. Id. at 546.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 545.
66. Luz P., 595 N.Y.S.2d at 545.
67. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
68. Id. at 1013.
69. Id. A systolic blood pressure deception test, known today as a polygraph or lie detector
test, monitors the defendant's blood pressure during a question and answer session. Id. at 1014.
Ifa defendant's responses are false, experts claim that his blood pressure will increase because, when
an individual consciously tries to conceal facts or one's guilt, corresponding emotions, such as fear
or anxiety, are created. These emotions normally increase a person's blood pressure. Id. Therefore,
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claimed that he could deduce from the deception test whether the
defendant gave truthful responses to an interrogation.7" The court found
that, before such evidence could be admitted, the scientific device
employed to deduce an expert's opinion must be "sufficiently established
to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it
belongs."'"
The Frye test has been applied in order to mitigate the unfair impact
that scientific evidence can have during a trial.72 A judge or jury may
view scientific evidence as inherently infallible because the evidence is
seemingly based on a scientifically deducible theory.7 3 If unchallenged
by cross-examination, "[s]cientific evidence may in some instances
assume a posture of mystic infallibility in the eyes of a jury or
laymen."74 The evidence may veil a flaw that is not ascertainable by a
person with little knowledge of the subject. 75 And, even if the scientific
theory is contradicted at trial, courts are concerned that the focus will
shift from the facts or heart of the issue to a dispute over the scientific
evidence.76 For these reasons, "[t]he Frye standard is used to screen out
testimony based on a controversial scientific technique because such
testimony threatens to redirect the focus of a trial away from its central
issues, and toward the controversey of the technique."" Courts alleviate
these concerns by using the Frye test to prove the accuracy of scientific
techniques before they are relied upon by the courts. Once a proponent

increases in blood pressure levels during questioning would indicate that the person is not being
truthful, as opposed to a steady reading which would indicate that the person is telling the truth. Id.
at 1014.
70. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
71. Id. Many courts have cited the following language, which establishes the Frye test.
"Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while
courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific
principle or discovery, the things from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established
to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs." Id. See generally
United States v. Valdez, 722 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161
(8th Cir. 1975); United States v. Hadley, 918 F.2d 848, 852 (9th Cir. 1990); People v. Kelly, 549
P.2d 1240, 1244 (Cal. 1976); Commonwealth v. Topa, 369 A.2d 1277, 1281 (Pa. 1977).
72. Frye, 293 F. at 1013-14.
73. Captain Alfred H. Novotne, Scientific Evidence: Challenging Admissibility, 1988 ARMY
LAW 23 (Oct. 1988). See also Cathleen C. Herasimchuk, A PracticalGuide to the Admissibility of
Novel Expert Evidence in CriminalTrials under FederalRule 702, 22 ST. MARY'S L. J. 181, 216-17
(1990).
74. United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
75. Id.
76. Reed v. State, 391 A.2d 364, 372 (Md. 1978); Adams v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 757 F.
Supp. 661, 668 (D. Md. 1991).
77. Adams, 757 F. Supp. at 668.
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empirically proves that a technique is generally accepted, most skepticism
and criticisms that would typically occur at trial are dispelled.
Although the Frye test cures many problems arising from the
admission of scientific evidence, the test has been criticized because it
creates a "nose-counting" type of analysis.7" In order to gain general
acceptance in the scientific community, scientists must quantitatively
Hence, scientists are reduced to
prove a technique's reliability.
performing repetitious studies to determine the probability of success.
While this analysis is suitable for objective, deductible techniques, this
"nose-counting" analysis becomes problematic when applied to subjective,
inductive techniques, such as battered woman syndrome. As a result,
some courts furnished a new standard to accommodate these inductive
techniques.
As an alternative to the Frye test, some courts have applied a
relevancy standard. The relevancy test still requires proof of the
reliability of the scientific evidence, but is particularly helpful for
admitting evidence that is too new to have gained general acceptance in
the scientific community. 79 In United States v. Downing,8" the court
examined four factors in determining the admissibility of scientific
evidence that was too new to have gained general acceptance."' The
court looked at the novelty of the technique, the literature relating to the
technique, the qualifications of the expert witness, and the nonjudicial
uses of the scientific technique.8 2 This approach is more flexible than
the Frye test because it considers several factors, including that a
technique may be too new to have gained general acceptance in the
relevant scientific community.8 3 The Supreme Court of the United
States, however, has restricted the application of the Frye test and the
relevancy standard in certain courts.

78. United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1117 (1979). In order to determine whether a scientific technique is generally acceptable within a
scientific community, courts will examine opinions of experts in that particular field. Jason D.
Altman, Admissibility ofForensic DNA Profiling Evidence: A Movement Away From Frye v. United
States AndA Step Toward The FederalRules of Evidence: United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786
(2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 104 (1992), 44 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 211 (1993).
This analysis focuses on the number of people who accept the technique, rather than on its reliability
or relevancy. Id.
79. See generally United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985); Andrews v.
Florida, 533 So.2d 841 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988), cert. denied, 542 So.2d 1332 (Fla. 1989).
80. 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985).
81. Id. at 1238.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1238-39.
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84 the Supreme Court
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
found that the Federal Rules of Evidence preempted the use of the Frye
and relevancy tests in federal courts and state courts which adopted the
Federal Rules.8 5 In Daubert, the plaintiffs petitioned the court to allow
expert testimony alleging that their children's birth defects were caused
by the mothers' prenatal ingestion of Bendectin, a drug marketed by the
defendant.8 6 The lower courts excluded the scientific evidence after
finding that it did not satisfy the requirements of the Frye test."
However, the Supreme Court found that the Federal Rules of Evidence,
not the Frye test, should have been applied to determine the admissibility
of the evidence.8
To clarify the rule for the admissibility of scientific evidence set
forth by the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Supreme Court created a
four-pronged test similar to the relevancy standard.89
First, in
determining whether a technique is based on scientific knowledge, a court
must look at its testability.9" The scientific knowledge must be capable
of empirical testing in order to prove its falsifiability, refutability, or
testability. 9' Second, a court should examine whether the theory or
technique has been published and subjected to peer review. 92 Third, the
court should examine the rate of error and standards governing a
technique. 93 Finally, general acceptance in the relevant scientific
community may assist the court in determining the technique's
reliability. 94 While courts have flexibility in how much weight to give
each factor, they must apply these factors when determining the

84. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
85. Id. at 2794. In 1975 Congress adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence, which established
the procedure for admitting scientific evidence in federal courts. See F. RULES EVID. § 701, etseq.
86. Daubert, 113 S. CL at 2789.
87. Id. at 2789.
88. Id. at 2795. Although the Frye test's application has been considerably weakened by this
holding, this Comment will discuss the generally applicability of admissibility rules for scientific
evidence to facilitated communication. Therefore, cases using Frye are helpful to illustrate the
general types of evidence that have typically been considered scientific. In addition, states that have
not adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence may still apply Frye.
89. Id. at 2796-97.
90. Id.
91. Daubert, 113 S. CL at 2769-97.
92. Id. at 2797. The Court recognizes that publications and peer reviews do not necessarily
correlate with reliability; therefore, to prove this element dispositive does not automatically make a
scientific technique inadmissible. Id.
93. Id. at 2797.
94. Id. Although the Federal Rules of Evidence do not mention the Frye test, the Court found
that general acceptance in a scientific community may have a bearing on a court's inquiry in whether
the scientific evidence is reliable. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2797.
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admissibility of scientific evidence, if their jurisdiction has adopted the
Federal Rules of Evidence.95
Although several different tests for the admissibility of scientific
evidence have been created, each test requires proof of a scientific
technique's reliability. Therefore, if facilitated communication is
classified as scientific evidence, its reliability must be quantitatively
proven before the evidence can be admitted in court.
V. Classifications of Scientific Evidence
Before applying the Frye test, relevancy test, and Federal Rules of
Evidence,
courts have categorized scientific evidence as "hard" or
"soft." 6 Testimony deduced from "hard" scientific evidence, which is
based on physiological or genetic studies, produces conclusive, objective
results.9 7 The evidence is quantifiably based on nonhuman, objective
testing devices.98 This type of evidence lends itself well to quantitative
testing because, once the variables are isolated, quantitative testing
necessarily produces a consistent result, which can be reproduced in a
laboratory. "Soft" scientific evidence, however, is typically an opinion
based on the study of human behavior; therefore, it is subjective and
incapable of scientific verification.9 9
Rather than being able to
accurately deduce a result (because all variables cannot be isolated),
scientists use quantitative testing to prove its general accuracy. As a
result, courts are more divided over whether particular "soft" scientific
techniques are admissible in court.' °

95. Id. at 2795. Although the Supreme Court established this framework for determining the
admissibility of scientific evidence, the Court noted that the Federal Rules of Evidence allow for a
flexible application. One expert argues that the Supreme Court's framework of admissibility under
the Federal Rules of Evidence may create a more demanding standard for "soft" scientific evidence.
Terence W. Campbell, The DaubertDecision And Its Effect On Expert Testimony; FRE 702 Is The
Guideline For Admissibility, MICH. LAW. WKLY., 13 Sept. 1993, at 5B. "Unlike the Frye test, which
permitted expert testimony premised upon [behavioral theories] because of its general acceptance
within the relevant professional community, the 'evidentiary reliability' standard of Daubert appears
to qualify such testimony as inadmissible. Consequently, this is but one example of how Daubert
may evolve at a more demanding standard for expert testimony then Frye." Id. Because this
Comment argues that facilitated communication should not be considered scientific evidence, the
degree of scrutiny that facilitated communication would undergo depending on what test is applied
will not be discussed.
96. Charles Bleil, Evidence of Syndromes: No Need For A "Better Mousetrap," 32 S.TEX.
L. REv. 37, 40 (Dec. 1990).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 39-41.
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These classifications expose the inherent differences in methodology
between the natural sciences and behavioral sciences, and these
differences provide a basis for determining the correct test for admitting
various types of scientific expert testimony.' 0'
"Hard" scientific
evidence provides a conclusive result, such as DNA testing, while "soft"
scientific evidence provides a general explanation to typical behavioral
responses, such as battered woman syndrome. The differences in clinical
testing necessarily require different scrutiny because "soft" scientific
techniques will tend to have less "general acceptance," especially given
that the techniques cannot be proven with scientific certainty.
Testimony based on scientific syndromes has typically been
considered "soft" scientific evidence because it is based on examining
types of human behavior. While courts have arrived at different
conclusions as to the admissibility of testimony based on a syndrome,
scientific admissibility rules have typically been applied to these "soft"
scientific evidences.0 2 Syndromes subjected to scientific admissibility
tests include battered woman syndrome,0 3 child abuse syndrome,"0 4
and rape trauma syndrome.0 5 Experts use these syndromes to explain
a type of human behavior resulting from a traumatic event, such as abuse.
These syndromes serve as defenses to certain actions' °6 or are used to
support the credibility of a witness.'0 7 Therefore, courts require the
opinions to be accurate since they can have a major impact on the results
of a trial.
Although hypnotically refreshed testimony' ° does not have the

101. Bleil, supra note 96, at 39-41. In In re MZ, the court distinguishes between "hard" and
"soft" scientific evidence and their differences in testing methodology. In re MZ, 590 N.Y.S.2d at
391. "Because 'soft' sciences are not objective or physiological, its reliability can only be proven
empirically or inferentially, not deductively." Id.
102. For example, some states, such as Georgia, Kansas, Maine, New Hampshire, New York,
Pennsylvania and Washington, have allowed evidence regarding the Battered Woman Syndrome
while other states, such as Louisiana, Ohio, and Wyoming, have not admitted this type of evidence.
Bleil, supra note 96, at 41.
103. See generally Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 455 A.2d 893 (D.C. 1983); State v. Hundley,
693 P.2d 475 (Kan. 1985); State v. Green, 652 P.2d 697 (Kan. 1982); Commonwealth v. Craig, 783
S.W.2d 387 (Ky. 1990); State v. Necaise, 466 So.2d 660 (La. Ct. App. 1985); Lentz v. State, 604
So.2d 243 (Miss. 1992); State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364 (N.J. 1984)
104. See generally State v. Kim, 645 P.2d 1330 (Haw. 1982); State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d
388 (Utah 1989).
105. See generally State v. Marks, 647 P.2d 1292 (Kan. 1982); Maryland v. Allewalt, 517 A.2d
741 (Md. 1986); State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227 (Minn. 1982); State v. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d 235
(Mo. 1984); State v. Burke, 719 S.W.2d 887 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); State v. Story, 575 N.Y.S.2d 589
(N.Y. App. Div. 1991).
106. See supra notes 103-105.
107. See supra notes 103-105.
108. Hypnotically refreshed testimony involves hypnotizing witnesses in order to refresh a
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characteristics of a syndrome, courts have applied scientific admissibility
tests before introducing the evidence.' 0 9 Hypnosis is distinguishable
from a syndrome because it allegedly produces an accurate memory and
is not a scientific opinion based on observations of a human
behavior." 0 Originally courts did not impose these scientific tests on
hypnosis."'
However, courts realized the difficulty in effectively
determining the accuracy and reliability of the evidence, therefore, they
required proof of its scientific reliability." 2
Because hypnosis has a tendency to create detailed events which can
not be proven or disproven absent corroborating evidence, crossexamination is ineffective in distinguishing the truth from fantasy." 3
Because the adversarial system can not expose whether the witness is
recalling facts or fantasy, expert testimony is necessary to challenge the
accuracy of hypnotically refreshed testimony.'"" These expert opinions,
therefore, need to be based on quantitative proof that the technique only
revives actual facts, not pseudomemories, in its subjects.'
Courts
apply scientific admissibility tests in order to resolve this inadequacy that
can not be discovered on a case-by-case basis.
VI. Inapplicability of Admissibility Rules to Facilitated
Communication
Courts have classified facilitated communication as "soft" scientific
evidence, thus requiring scientific testing. In making this conclusion,
courts were generally concerned with the reliability of the technique. In
Subsection A, this Comment explains why facilitated communication is

memory of events or details. William G. Traynor, The Admissibility of Hypnotically Influenced
Testimony, 55 TENN. L. REV. 785, 788 (1988).
109. See generally State v. Mena, 624 P.2d 1274 (Ariz. 1981); Rodriguez v. State, 327 So.2d
903 (Fla. App. 1976); People v. Shirley, 641 P.2d 775 (1982); People v. Tait, 297 N.W.2d 853
(Mich. App. 1980); State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1980); State v. Hurd, 432 A.2d 86 (N.J.
1981); People v. Hughes, 453 N.E.2d 484 (N.Y. 1983); State v. Weston, 475 N.E.2d 805 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1984); Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, 436 A.2d 170 (Pa. 1981).
110. Weston, 475 N.E.2d at 809; Traynor, supra note 108, at 788.
111. See Clark v. State, 379 So.2d 372 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Harding v. State, 246 A.2d
302 (Md. App. 1968), cert. denied, 89 S.Ct. 2030 (1969); State v. McQueen, 244 S.E.2d 414 (N.C.
1978).
112. Weston, 475 N.E.2d at 809.
113. Id. According to one author, hypnosis has a tendency to distort the subject's memory of
a given event for two reasons. Traynor, supra note 108, at 788. First, the subjects own desire to
help the police or their knowledge of the purpose for the hypnosis may lead to incorrect recollections
of events. Second, hypnosis tends to make people less critical of events that they would usually
doubt because they place an undue emphasis on the accuracy of hypnotic recollections.
114. Weston, 475 N.E.2d 805, 809 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984).
115. Id.
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mislabeled as scientific and why, therefore, scientific admissibility tests
are inapplicable. Subsection B discusses the reliability issue. Ultimately
this concern led to facilitated communication's classification as scientific
evidence as courts sought for a standard to address the unique problems
with facilitated communication. These problems however are more
appropriately addressed by a case-by-case analysis, not by scientific
testing. Finally, Subsection C will illustrate the inequities of requiring
scientific testing.
A. The Admissibility Issue: FacilitatedCommunication Falls Outside
the Scope of Scientific Admissibility Rules
Facilitated communication does not fall under the traditional
classification of "hard" or "soft" scientific evidence. The typed product
of facilitated communication is neither based on a deductible theory nor
is it an opinion based on a behavioral syndrome.
Facilitated
communication simply involves a person recounting events or facts by
typing on a keyboard. Because many people with autism are unable to
verbally communicate, this technique serves as a medium to express their
thoughts in typewritten form. Its authenticity, therefore, should be proven
by individually examining a person's ability to communicate, not by
examining a class of individuals' ability to communicate.
In determining whether facilitated communication constitutes
scientific evidence, courts should be mindful of which aspect of
facilitated communication is being admitted as evidence." 6 Application
of the Frye test or any other scientific test would be appropriate if a party
wished to introduce evidence explaining why a person with autism can
communicate using facilitated communication because this type of
evidence attempts to explain a human behavior in relation to a
technique.' 7 In other words, the process itself is being addressed and
presented as evidence. This, however, is not the situation when
individuals seek to introduce the typed product of facilitated
communication. Such evidence is a first-hand account of a factual
incident. Courts have not typically applied the Frye test or any other

116. Alberico, 861 P.2d at 192. In determining whether the scientific evidence was admissible,
the court distinguished among the different purposes for the evidence and found it admissible for
certain purposes, but not others. Id.
117. Id. For example, one expert suggests that people with autism successfully utilize facilitated
communication because they are also taught how to eat using a similar technique. Biklen, supra note
2, at 177.
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scientific test to such evidence, with the exception of hypnotically
refreshed testimony." 8
Hypnosis is very different from facilitated communication however.
Although hypnosis allegedly supplies a first-hand account of a witnesses'
experience, the accuracy of an individual's hypnotically induced
testimony can not be determined in court. Therefore, data based on
quantitative testing is necessary to understand the effects of hypnosis on
people's memory generally." 9 Originally many courts believed that the
flaws of hypnosis could be exposed through cross-examination."'
However, hypnosis has a tendency to produce fantasies that an individual
believes to be true, thereby making it difficult or even impossible to
expose inaccuracies in the testimony.' 2 ' Unlike hypnosis, the potential
inaccuracies of facilitated communication can be effectively addressed
during a trial and without expert testimony. 22 Therefore, courts need
not invoke any scientific tests to prove the accuracy of facilitated
communication.
In In re Luz P., the court found that expert testimony was not
necessary to apply the technique. 2 3 This decision is appropriate as
applied to facilitated communication because the facilitator merely
accommodates for the person's inability to adequately use his or her
motor skills to communicate. Facilitators do not assert their opinions
during the technique, rather they physically and emotionally support the
person. Courts, therefore, should focus on the accuracy of each
individual communication rather than focusing on the reliability of an
entire class of individuals to communicate.
This scientific standard placed on facilitated communication departs
from the courts' traditional analysis of unique methods of testifying.
Historically, courts have allowed a witness' testimony even though it may
be produced by using unconventional means of communication. 24 If

118. People v. McDonald, 690 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1987).
119. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
120. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
121. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
122. See infra Part VI, Subsection B.
123. In re Luz P., 595 N.Y.S.2d 541, 545 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d 1993).
124. See Burgess v. State, 53 So.2d 568 (Ala. 1951); Brown v. State, 331 So.2d 820 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1976); Hyman v. State, 338 So.2d 448 (Ala. Crim. App. 1976); Todd v. State 380 So
2d 370 (Ala. Crim. App. 1980); Dobbins v. Little R.R. & E. Co., 95 S.W. 794 (Ark. 1906); Hughes
V. Tapley, 177 S.W.2d 429 (1944), rev 'don other grounds,Southern Cotton Oil Div. V. Childress,
337 S.W.2d 167 (Ark. 1944); Ritchey v. People, 47 P. 272, reh'g denied, 47 P. 384 (Colo. 1896);
People v. Spencer, 457 N.E.2d 473 (D.111. 1983); Snyder v. Nations, 5 Blackf. 295 (Ind. 1840); State
v. Butler, 138 N.W. 383 (Iowa 1912); Bugg v. Houlka, 84 So. 387 (Miss. 1920); State v. Howard,
24 S.W. 41 (Mo. 1893); State v. Smith, 102 S.W. 526 (Mo. 1907); Kley v. Abell, 483 S.W.2d 625
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individuals can not speak, courts have allowed them to use different
means of communication so long as that communication can be accurately
and reliably translated into English.' 2 5 For example, in Commonwealth
v. Clark, a twenty-five year old deaf-mute woman had no knowledge of
a recognized or standard sign language.'2 6 This inability did not
prohibit her from testifying.' In permitting the witness to testify, the
court stated that "[s]uch a witness is not confined to the sign language
common to deaf mutes, but, if [her] own arbitrary signs can be
interpreted, [she] can testify through those signs."'2 8
In John Ruston's Case, the court also admitted testimony from a
deaf man who communicated with his sister by using arbitrary signs that
they had invented between themselves.' 29 A witness' inability to testify
using a standard mode of communication does not invalidate the
testimony, nor does it invoke scientific testing requirements. Courts such
as Clark and John Ruston's Case merely prove the qualitative reliability
of that particular type of testimony. 3 ° Facilitated communication is
another unique method of communication that should be verified on an
individual basis, not by scientific testing.
Although it may be difficult to cross examine a witness who is
disabled and unable to testify by a traditional mode of communication,
these concerns have typically gone to the weight of the testimony. 3 '
In Snyder v. Nation, the court held that a deaf witness "may nevertheless

(Mo. Ct. App. 1972); State v. Randolph, 698 S.W.2d 535 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); State v. Galloway,
284 S.E.2d 509 (N.C. 1981); People v. McGee I Denio 19 (N.Y. 1845); Cowley v. People 83 N.Y.
464 (1881); Commonwealth v. Clark 52 Pa. D. & C. 189 (Phil. Cty. Ct. 1944); State v. Weldon 17
S.E. 699 (S.C. 1893).
125. See generally Burgess, 53 So.2d at 570-1 (allowing a witness, who communicated by using
arbitrary signs, motions and gestures, to testify by using her brother as an interpreter); Kaelin v.
State, 410 So.2d 1355, 1356 (D.FIa. Ct. App. 1982) (permitting a victim of sexual abuse to testify
who had cerebral palsy, a severe hearing deficiency, an I.Q. of 54, and the sign language ability of
a six to eight year old); Spencer, 457 N.E.2d at 473, 475 (permitting a woman, who was mute, to
testify by using gestures that she was raped. When asked, she demonstrated the distinction between
intercourse and rape by making pushing and choking gestures. She used a blackboard containing
letters, numbers, colors, picture symbols, and anatomically correct dolls); Kley, 483 S.W. 2d at 625,
626 (admitting testimony of a deaf-mute who had no means of communication other than making
grunts, gestures and motion); People v. Thompson, 309 N.Y.S.2d 861, 862 (N.Y. App. Div. 1970)
(allowing a defendant, who was deaf, illiterate and communicated by making verbal sounds which
could be understood only by those with special training, to testify in court); Clark, 52 Pa. D & C.
at 189 (permitting a 25-year-old deaf-mute victim of an assault and battery to testify even though she
could neither read nor write, nor had knowledge of a standard type of sign language).
126. Clark, 52 Pa. D & C. 189 (Phil. Cty. Ct. 1944).
127. Id. at 193.
128. Id. at 192 (quoting 3 WHARTON CRiMINAL EVIDENCE (11th ed.), 2020 sec. 1172).
129. 168 Eng. Rep. 306 (1786).
130. See supra notes 124-125 and accompanying text.
131. Burgess v. Alabama, 53 So.2d 568 (Ala. 1951)
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be permitted to testify, but it is said that his disability may be considered
by the jury, as bearing upon the weight of the testimony. That difficulty
attends the examination of a deaf-mute is no reason why his testimony
should be excluded."' 32 In Burgess v. State, the court permitted a deaf
individual to testify. The court found that
though a [deaf] person may not be educated in the use of signs and
can only express assent or dissent by a nod or shake of the head, thus
rendering cross-examination difficult, he may nevertheless be
permitted to testify, but it is said that his disability may be considered
by the jury, as bearing upon the weight of his testimony. That
difficulty attends the examination of a deaf-mute is no reason why his
testimony should be excluded.'33
These concerns have not invoked the Frye test nor any other scientific
test in the past, and, therefore, facilitated communication should not be
treated differently from any other testimony received from a person with
a special impairment. A court may have concerns over the facilitator's
influence, however, these concerns can be addressed without altering the
traditional standards for admitting testimony given under special
circumstances.
B. The Reliability Issue: Solutions To Concerns Over Admitting
FacilitatedCommunication
Because the application of facilitated communication requires an
individual to physically support the typist, courts are concerned with
conscious and unconscious manipulation by the facilitator. 3 4 Critics
argue that the communications are actually created by the facilitator
physically manipulating the typist.'35 The court can inappropriately
guard against this danger by requiring quantitative scientific proof of the
technique's reliability.'3 6 In DSS ex rel. Jenny S., the court stated that
"[t]he basic problem with admitting facilitated communications is the

132. Snyder v. Nations, 5 Blackf. 295 (Ind. 1840). See also Ritchey v. Colo., 47 P. 272, 273
(Colo. 1896); Conn. v. De Wolf, 8 Conn. 93, 99 (1830); Quinn v. Halbert, 55 Vt. 224 (1882).
133. Burgess v. Alabama, 53 So.2d 568 (Ala. 1951) (citations omitted). This Comment does
not address the constitutional issue that a party's right to confront the witness is violated if facilitated
communication is admitted in court. However, courts should also address this constituional issue in
a manner similar to sign language testimony. In State v. Spencer, the court rejected the constitutional
argument once they found that an individual was able to communicate, regardless of the means used
1983); see also People v. Younghanz, 202
to testify. State v. Spencer, 457 N.E.2d 473, 484-85 (I11.
Cal. Rptr. 907, 912 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
134. DSS ex rel. Jenny S. v. Mark & Laura S., 593 N.Y. S.2d 142, 146 (Fam. Ct. 1992).
135. Id.
136. Id.
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determination as to whether the facilitator, in aiding in a communication,
creates an inherently suggestive procedure."' 37 While this concern is
certainly valid, scientific studies are inappropriate because facilitated
communication does not fall under the catergories of "hard" or "soft"
scientific evidence.
Potential facilitator manipulation can be effectively corrected by
modifying the technique for legal hearings. First, the court should
prevent the facilitator from hearing the questions being asked of the
witness. Therefore, if a question is accurately answered without the
facilitator's knowledge of the question, the court can be assured that the
facilitator did not influence the correct answer. 3 Second, the court
can examine a person's past instances of communication with other
facilitators to see if the testimony is grammatically and semantically
consistent. People with autism type differently, as does any person who
writes. Therefore, if the messages are truly their own, their styles and
word associations should remain consistent even when facilitators change.
Finally, the court can ask a witness questions to which the answers are
outside the knowledge of the facilitator.' 39 These techniques effectively

137. Id. Even though Jenny S. dealt with admitting an out-of-court statement obtained via
facilitated communication, the court still inappropriately invoked the Frye test, and the arguments
asserted in this Comment are equally applicable to that case. The court should have examined the
way in which the technique was administered. If the defendant could have shown that manipulation
did not occur, the court should have treated the evidence similarly to other out-of-court statements.
The decision in Jenny S. has also been adopted by cases involving the admissibility of in-court
statements. See e.g., In Re M.Z., 590 N.Y.S.2d 390 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1992). The inequity resulting
from applying Frye is even more apparent given that the court denied Jenny S.'s statement even
though she typed the same abuse allegations to a court appointed facilitator. Pforr, supra note 9, at
A7.
138. In reliability tests, the facilitators are prevented from hearing the questions in order to
determine if they are manipulating the data. See supra note 53 (discussing Australian study in which
reliability of facilitated communication was demonstrated by not allowing the facilitators to hear the
question). If this technique is adequate for scientific tests, the courts should adopt this procedure in
order to safeguard against physical manipulation.
A teacher at BenHaven, a school for children with autism, asked Ms. Tardanico, a speech
pathologist, to facilitate with a student because she was concerned with something the young man
was communicating. With no knowledge of the content, Ms. Tardanico facilitated with the student
who typed "kill." The student had typed the same word with the teacher. Telephone interview with
Jamie Tardanico, speech language and communication pathologist at BenHaven in West Haven, CT
(Nov. 17, 1993).
139. A partially verbal young woman with autism, originally diagnosed as being deaf, requested
to learn how to cut hair during a communication session in 1991. The technique was administered
with the facilitator's hand on her hand. This request had not surprised the facilitator since the young
woman enjoyed having her hair cut and brushed. Subsequently, she attended a program to learn how
to cut hair. In 1993, she communicated to another facilitator, who had no knowledge of her original
request, that she wanted to learn how to cut hair. Telephone interview with Michele C. Martin, a
facilitator and teacher at BenHaven in West Haven, CT (Oct. 15, 1993).
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alleviate the concern of manipulation without requiring quantitative
studies of its validity. Furthermore, because an individual is producing
the communication, this qualitative study is more accurate than
quantitative tests because it takes each individual's unique typing styles,
mannerisms, and abilities into account.
Physical support administered by facilitated communication varies
with each person. 4 ' Therefore, a person's ability to communicate may
be validated by watching the administration of the technique. Some
people need support on their hand or in isolating an index finger, while
others need only slight physical support of the forearm.' 4 ' If a person
only receives slight physical support, courts may verify that the subject
is typing because the student's initiation of movements are more
pronounced. By initially requiring the proponent to prove the general
acceptance or reliability of facilitated communication, courts have
prevented people with autism from testifying until science proves the
reliability of an entire class of individuals' communications.'
As a
result, courts have prevented individuals who can validate their own
communications from seeking justice.
Even if the quantitative reliability of facilitated communication is
proven, courts may still have reliability problems in specific cases
because a facilitator can manipulate the data at any time. In other words,
quantitative tests may prove the general validity of facilitated
communication, but at trial a court will still be required to address the
very issue that Frye was intended to rectify because a facilitator may
manipulate the typist's hand at any time in the procedure. In Bugg v.
Houlka, the court held that a "showing must be made in any given case
that the witness has a system of communication."'' 43 This reasoning is
logically sound, especially when applied to facilitated communication.
If courts treat a witness' facilitated communication like sign language and
merely require the witness to individually prove his ability to
communicate, courts will be insured that the testimony is accurate. By
requiring quantitative scientific tests, courts have directed this dispute
down a meaningless path which will not resolve the heart of the issue,
namely facilitator influence, and will delay victims from obtaining justice.
Therefore, courts must redirect their focus and apply long standing case
law to provide an appropriate solution.

140.
141.
142.
1992).
143.

Biklen, supra note 2, at 164.
See generally Biklen, supra note 2.
See DSS ex rel. Jenny S. v. Mark & Laura S.,593 N.Y.S.2d 142, 152 (N.Y. Fan. Ct.
84 So. 387, 388 (Miss. 1920).
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In Maryland, a nine-year-old girl with autism typed with the aid of
a facilitator that she had been sexually assaulted between the ages of five
and seven.'
Two days after the initial accusation, she repeated the
allegations in the presence of a social worker and police officer, and she
identified her attacker. A subsequent medical examination revealed that
she had a healed sexual injury to the vaginal area. 4 ' A Montgomery
County Circuit Court Judge dismissed the case after the girl failed a test
designed to determine her ability to communicate.' 46 The girl was
placed in a classroom setting, shown two paragraphs, and asked a total
of six questions. The facilitator was not allowed to see the paragraphs,
and the girl gave all wrong answers. Despite the dismissal of this
particular case, the judge stated that he would determine future
admissibility issues of this nature on a case-by-case basis, and he would
not require a Frye-type test. In this case, the judge appropriately required
testing of the individual before her testimony was admitted into court.
The technique showed whether the girl was competent to testify without
invoking general testing of a group of individuals.' 47 This case
illustrates the effectiveness of qualitative testing without the need for
quantitative tests.
C. Inequities of Requiring FacilitatedCommunication to Overcome
Scientific Admissibility and Reliability Tests
By requiring general quantitative testing, the courts have shifted the
focus from an individual's ability to communicate to the ability of a class
of people to communicate. In Jenny S., the court did not even examine
the substance of the allegations even though Jenny facilitated the same
allegations to a court appointed facilitator. 4 If scientific admissibility
tests govern the admissibility of evidence obtained by facilitated
communication, these inequities will continue. The emphasis on these
quantitative studies has undermined the qualitative studies which could

144. Eugene L. Meyer, Autistic Girl's Rape Case heightens Debate Over 'Facilitated
Communication,' WASH. POST, Dec. 27, 1993, at BI.
145. Id.
146. Eugene L. Meyer, Autistic Girl Barred From Testifying; Rape Case Dismissed After
Alleged Victim Fails Communication Test, WASH. POST, April 23, 1994, at B5.
147. Although the court properly callled for testing the witness, this author takes issue with the
substance of the test. The girl was asked to read two paragraphs and answer questions based on the
reading. This test was not only a test of communicating, but a test on reading comprehension.
Because she had testified to a physical assault on her person, the court should have administered a
test of sensory perceptions. She may not have a high competency for reading comprehension, but
she may be able to communicate what she sees or feels.
148. Pforr, supra note 9, at A7.
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validate an individual's ability to accurately communicate free from a
facilitator's manipulation.
Quantitative testing has not been as successful as qualitative testing
for several reasons. First, the symptoms characterizing individuals as
having autism constantly change and are hotly criticized) 49
An
individual can be diagnosed with autism by exhibiting at least eight of
sixteen characteristics. 5 ' Therefore, these people exhibit different
symptoms and varying degrees of impairments. 5
An appropriate
application of facilitated communication accounts for these differences,
while quantitative testing does not.' 52 Second, these tests invalidate
students' responses that may be contextually correct based on past
communications, but initially appear incorrect. Qualitative studies show
that individuals with autism have their own labeling system which may
not be taken into account in quantitative testing. Third, people with
autism have a tendency to focus on a particular item of personal
interest.' 53 While applying the test, the people may still be answering
prior questions. Even though their responses may not be correct at the
exact moment they are given, with verbal prompting and by slowing
down the testing, these people can validate their communications.' 5 4
For these reasons, quantitative validation is less accurate than qualitative
testing.
Because individuals with motor and communication deficits are
prone to sexual or physical abuse, the courts need to accommodate their
conditions so that they can seek legal recourse. Because people with
autism had limited means to effectively communicate prior to the use of
facilitated communication,' 55 they were virtually defenseless to stopping
physical or sexual abuse. Past courts have recognized this reality with

149. See supra Part II.
150. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
151. Rapin, supra note 19, at 1180. "[nhere are distinct syndromes among autistic children,
and that one can assign children to these syndromes based on the type of their language disorder,
sociability, and play. Other investigators view the disorder as ranging along a continuum of severity,
from very mild to very severe, rather than as a syndromic spectrum of disorders." Id.
152. Biklen, supra note 2, at 164.
153. Ms. Tardanico facilitated with a young man who enjoyed reading National Geographics;
however, when he would see an animal being eaten by another animal, he would perseverate on the
word "dead." Each time he saw these types of pictures, he would type this word with different
facilitators who had no knowledge of this condition. Telephone interview with Jamie Tardanico,
speech and communication pathologist at BenHaven in West Haven, CT. (Nov. 17, 1993).
154. Biklen, supra note 26, at 296. For example, a facilitator asked a young man his name.
He typed a correct response of"Louis." The facilitator then asked him to type something else. He
typed "Pocco." The facilitator was confused; however, she eventually realized that the young man
was still responding to her first question by typing his last name as well.
155. Biklen, supra note 2, at 162.
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other disabled people and have allowed unique methods of
communication in court. 56
Courts should treat facilitated
communication similarly. Once this is done, individuals with autism can
seek retribution and justice, perpetrators will be punished for their crimes,
and other people will be deterred from abusing individuals with special
impairments. In In re Luz P., the court criticizes the holding in Jenny S.,
stating that "[t]he best interests of the child are far more important than
some technical objection which . . . appears to have little substance."'5 7
The Luz P. decision supports the argument that the dispute over
facilitated communication should go to the weight of the testimony and
credibility of the witness, rather than the general admissibility of
facilitated communication as scientific evidence.
Although facilitated communication is an innovative technique for
obtaining evidence, courts should take a traditional approach in allowing
its admissibility. "The courts have come out of the dark ages with
respect to the treatment of the deaf and hearing impaired, and [they]
should likewise do so with respect to other physical and mental
disabilities."' 58 Even though courts must accommodate for potential
manipulation by the facilitator, this difficulty should not require that
facilitated communication be classified as a scientific theory. As
demonstrated, scientific testing need not be invoked to demonstrate the
accuracy of facilitated communication. 59 Furthermore, if an oppossing
party wishes to challenge its accuracy, courts should examine60 the
competency of the witness and the qualifications of the facilitator.
VII. Viewing Facilitated Communication Pertaining to Each Witness
and Facilitator
As a general rule, a person may testify if he or she demonstrates an
ability to remember and disclose facts accurately and can understand the
nature of an oath to tell the truth.' 6 1 In order to determine if a witness

156. See supra notes 124-125. See also State v. Galloway, 284 S.E.2d 509, 515 (1981) (stating
that "[a]ny confusion arising from the use of sign language to communicate with a deaf and mute
witness goes to the weight, and not the admissibility, of the evidence. To hold otherwise would
allow this defendant and others to commit crimes against persons bom deaf and mute with
impunity.").
157. In re Luz P., 595 N.Y.S.2d 541, 546 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d 1993).
158. People v. Miller, 530 N.Y.S.2d 490 (Rochester Cty. Ct. 1988).
159. See supra Part VI, Subsection B.
160. Luz P., 595 N.Y.S.2d at 546.
161. See State v. Alexander, 724 P.2d 1304, 1308 (Colo. 1986) (holding that a witness may
testify if he understands the nature of the oath, perceives what he is going to testfily about, remembers
those events perceived, recalls these perceptions, and communicates these recollections accurately).
See also Burgess v. State, 53 So.2d 568 (Ala. 1951); Hyman v. State, 338 So.2d 448 (Ala. Crim.
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understands the nature of the oath, courts examine the witness' ability to
understand the requirement of telling the truth.' 62 This requirement can
be fulfilled by examining whether the witness can differentiate between
right and wrong 163 or is aware of the moral obligation to tell the
truth. 164 Some courts fulfill this requirement by allowing the witnesses'
teachers to testify on behalf of the witness. 65 If the court permits the
use of facilitated communication and protects against manipulation, it can
effectively determine if a person appreciates the sanctity of the oath.
Further, the court must determine whether the witness can accurately
recall the facts, which can also be illustrated on a case-by-case basis.
Even if a court safeguards against physical manipulation, parties can
still challenge the facilitator's ability to effectively apply the
technique. 166 In order to decide if the facilitator is qualified to assist
in the witness' communication, the court should examine the facilitator's
educational background, training, experience with using facilitated
communication, and the facilitator's experience with working with that
particular witness. 67 The facilitator's ability to get effective results can
be determined by not allowing the facilitator to hear the questions being
asked of the witness. If the witness can correctly respond to the
questions, then the facilitator's ability to effectively assist the
communication without manipulation is verified. If a court is unsatisfied
with a facilitator's qualifications, they may appoint another person to
apply the technique. 6 This finding, however, should not prevent an
individual from testifying.

App. 1976); Snyder v. Nations, 5 Blackf. 295 (Ind. 1840); State v. Rodriquez, 429 A.2d 919 (Conn.
1980); People v. Tisi, 167 N.W.2d 795 (Mich. 1969); Villarreal v. State 576 S.W.2d 51 (Tex. Crim.
1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885 (1978).
162. See infra note 163.
163. Hyman, 338 So.2d at 885 (permitting a deaf-mute witness' teacher to testify that the
witness knew the difference between right and wrong); Rodriguez, 429 A.2d at 919 (holding that
witness' knowledge of the punishment of perjury was not necessary, just that he knew to tell the
truth); Snyder, 5 Blackf. at 295 (finding that the witness understood that perjury is punishable by
law); Tisi, 167 N.W.2d at 795 (concluding from testimony that the witness knew of the obligation
of an oath.)
164. Burgess, 53 So.2d at 568 (finding that witness showed her understanding of the moral and
religious nature of an oath).
165. Villarreal, 576 S.W.2d at 51 (finding that courts may allow teachers to testify that the
witness was taught in school that it is wrong to lie, that they would be punished for lying, and that
the witness would understand the nature of the oath.)
166. In re Luz P., 595 N.Y.S.2d 541, 546 (N.Y. A.D.2d 1993).
167. Id.
168. Id.

99

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

SPRING

1995

VII. Conclusion
In In re Luz P., the court properly held that facilitated
communication is a process of transmitting thoughts into written word.
Therefore, facilitated communication falls outside the classification of
"soft" scientific evidence. Facilitators merely assist people with autism
to communicate. This process requires no scientific theories or expert
testimony. As in any unique mode of communication, a person's
impairments are accommodated in order to allow them to communicate.
Historically courts have not considered this scientific evidence; rather,
they classify it as communicative evidence.
By classifying facilitated communication as scientific, the courts are
preventing an entire class of individuals from testifying in court. The
courts invoked the Frye test out of concern that the facilitators physically
manipulated the childs' hands while they were typing. Although this
concern certainly merits attention, the courts should not have classified
the technique as scientific in order to address it. By preventing the
facilitator from hearing the questions asked of the witness, the court can
be assured the facilitator is not manipulating any responses to the
questions. Courts have come out of the dark ages with their treatment of
the hearing impaired. They should do so for people with autism so that
these indivduals can have their testimony fairly weighed in court. By
shutting the door on people with autism, the courts have avoided
considering the substance of the allegations made by these people. In
doing so, the courts have further victimized individuals with autism who
may have legitimate claims of abuse.
Vincent J Candelora*
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